External socialization Kelley 2004: Socialization large ineffective in contrast to incentives Vachudova 2005: passive leverage ineffective Schimmelfennig 2005; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 2006 Adoption of EU political norms endogenous in early democratizing countries (not an EU effect) Otherwise a result of credible membership incentives and low domestic political costs Ineffectiveness of regional organizations that work without major material incentives (OSCE, Council of Europe) EU socialization does not produce new preferences or identities; compliance results from replacing anti-reform and anti-EU elites with pro-reform and pro-EU elites Positive identification facilitates compliance when political costs are high and membership is close (but identification was given) Change of identification occurs in the opposition rather than in government 9
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